

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

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MBFR-04 SAJ-01 ACDA-19 H-03 NSC-10 SS-15 IO-15 DRC-01

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ALL NATO CAPITALS 3349

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4831

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: ATLANTIC RELATIONS: NATO DECLARATION

BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD PROPOSED IN COUNCIL OCTOBER 10 THAT NAC AGREE TO PROCEED WITH DRAFTING OF A NATO TEXT, USING THE FRENCH DRAFT AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE. WHILE SOME FAVORED BASING WORK ON FRENCH TEXT, CANADA, SUPPORTED BY NETHERLANDS, NORWAY AND ITALY, MAINTAINED THAT FRENCH DRAFT SHOULD NOT HAVE PRIMACY OVER OTHER NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS. AT SUGGESTION OF BELGIAN AND FRENCH REPS, PERMREPS AGREED TO FURTHER EXCHANGE OF IDEAS IN COUNCIL, NOT BASED UPON ANY SPECIFIC NATIONAL DRAFT, TO "COMPOSE" DECLARATION, FOLLOWING WHICH SPC WOULD DRAFT ACTUAL TEXT UNDER COUNCIL'S GUIDANCE. CANADA OBJECTED ELOQUENTLY TO U.S.-EUROPE THRUST OF FRENCH DRAFT, TO EXCLUSION OF CANADA. BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS ASKED U.S. TO PROVIDE LANGUAGE ON BURDEN-SHARING, AND NETHERLANDS SUGGESTED NON-EC NATO MEMBERS SUGGEST TEXTS ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY MATTERS. END SUMMARY.

1. U.S. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD LED OFF OCTOBER 10 COUNCIL
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BY SETTING FORTH U.S. VIEWS ON PREPARATION OF AN ATLANTIC DECLARATION. HE PROPOSED THAT THE COUNCIL NOW PROCEED WITH THE DRAFTING OF A COMMON TEXT, USING THE FRENCH DRAFT (USNATO 4734) AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE. SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE (SPC),

USING FRENCH DRAFT AS THE BASIS FOR WORK, COULD BEGIN PROMPTLY TO DEVELOP A DRAFT. THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE WITH A DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY IN DRAFTING PROCESS. (FULL TEXT OF RUMSFELD STATEMENT SENT SEPTTEL TO ALL ADDRESSEES.)

2. ITALY. ITALIAN PERMREP CATALANO SUPPORTED U.S. PROCEDURAL SUGGESTION.

3. LUXEMBOURG. LUXEMBOURG PERMREP FISCHBACK TERMED FRENCH DRAFT "DETERMINING CONTRIBUTION" IN DEFENSE AND SECURITY FIELD, WITH ITS REFERENCE TO U.S. NUCLEAR GUARANTEE AND ROLE OF U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE FINAL DECLARATION SHOULD STRESS THAT NATO SEEKS DISARMAMENT, AND THAT IT IS THE OTHER SIDE THAT MAKES THIS GOAL UNACHIEVABLE. FISCHBACK PARTICULARLY VALUED THE FRENCH DRAFT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR. AS TO THE FRENCH FORMULATIONS ABOUT CSCE, FISCHBACK THOUGHT NATO SHOULD AVOID PLACING RELATIONS AMONG THE 35 AND AMONG THE 15 ON THE SAME PLANE. THE NATO DECLARATION SHOULD HAVE SOME LANGUAGE REFERRING TO ECONOMIC MATTERS, CITING ARTICLE 2 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. FISCHBACK CONCLUDED THAT ISSUANCE OF A NATO DECLARATION WAS NOT THE END BUT RATHER THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS TO IMPROVE THE WHOLE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP.

4. GREECE IN WELCOMING FRENCH DRAFT AND POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING ON A DECLARATION AMONG THE 15, GREEK PERMREP CHORAFAS SAID THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MATTERS COULD NOT BE DISCARDED IN A NATO DECLARATION. HIS DELEGATION WOULD PRESENT SPECIFIC IDEAS IN THE SPC IF COUNCIL ADOPTED U.S. PROCEDURAL APPROACH.

5. BELGIUM. DE STAERCKE EXPRESSED PEASURE IN RECEIVING U.S. "INPUT". NATO COULD NOW WORK CONCRETELY, USING THE FRENCH DRAFT AS THE BASIS. THE FRENCH TEXT WAS PERFECT, BUT NEEDED ADDITIONS. AS TO THE ROLES OF THE COUNCIL AND SPC, DE STAERCKE THOUGHT IT WAS "FUNDAMENTAL" THAT BEFORE ACTUAL DRAFTING GETS UNDERWAY IN SPC, PERMREPS EXPRESS NATIONAL IDEAS AND CONCEPTS
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IN THE COUNCIL ON A DOCUMENT AS IMPORTANT AS THIS DECLARATION. SYG LUNS SUPPORTED DE STAERCKE.

6. UK. PECK SUPPORTED FRENCH TEXT AS A STARTING POINT, AND AGREED WITH DE STAERCKE'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL.

7. CANADA. CANADIAN REP MARSHALL REFERRED TO TEXT HIS DELEGATION HAD TABLED SEPTEMBER 18 ABOUT WHICH THERE HAD BEEN MANY FAVORABLE COMMENTS. GIVEN THOSE EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE CANADIAN TEXT, HE SUGGESTED THAT DRAFTING COULD FOCUS ON FRENCH TEXT CONCERNING SECURITY MATTERS, BUT THAT THE CANADIAN TEXT SHOULD NOT BE PUT ASIDE. RATHER, NATO

SHOULD WORK ON A SYNTHESIS OF MAXIMALIST AND MINIMALIST APPROACHES WHICH CANADIAN AND FRENCH TEXTS REPRESENTED. HE COULD NOT PUT ASIDE CANADIAN TEXT WITHOUT SEEKING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

8. LUNS AND DE STAERCKE AGREED WITH MARSHALL, ALTHOUGH LATTER SAW A DANGER IN WORKING FROM TWO TEXTS.

9. NETHERLANDS. BUWALDA SAID THE HAGUE WELCOMED THE FRENCH DRAFT AS THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY "CHAPTER" OF AN OVERALL DECLARATION. HE UNDERLINED THAT THIS SHOULD BE ONLY CHAPTER, ALBEIT THE MOST IMPORTANT. GON COULD NOT ACCEPT PRIMACY OF FRENCH TEXT OVER CANADIAN, NOR COULD IT AGREE SIMPLY TO ADD PARAGRAPHS TO THE FRENCH TEXT.

10. NORWAY. BUSCH SUPPORTED CANADIAN AND DUTCH POSITIONS.

11. DENMARK. SVART CONSIDERED THAT FRENCH DRAFT CONTAINS MANY ELEMENTS SUITABLE FOR PUBLIC PRESENTATION, ALTHOUGH A CERTAIN FLESHING OUT OF THE FRENCH DRAFT WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

12. FRANCE. DE ROSE EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE POSITIVE REACTION BY MOST ALLIES, ESPECIALLY FROM THE U.S. PARIS WILL WELCOME AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT WITH THE UTMOST SATISFACTION, SINCE FRANCE HAD ATTEMPTED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE U.S. INITIATIVE AND WILL BE HAPPY TO HAVE "SCORED A BULLSEYE." IN EFFORT TO ALLAY CANADIAN CONCERNS, DE ROSE SAID THAT FRENCH TEXT WAS NOT ORIGINAL, BUT DREW FROM THE VARIOUS NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS, OF
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WHICH THE CANADIAN DOCUMENT WAS CLEARLY THE BEST "TABLEAU" OF IDEAS AND WAS IN ITSELF A "TOUR DE FORCE". WHAT MADE THE FRENCH DOCUMENT DISTINCTIVE, IN DE ROSE'S VIEW, WAS ITS MODE OF PRESENTATION RATHER THAN ITS SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT. IT SOUGHT TO HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION AND TO SET FORTH THE RECIPROCAL DEFENSE COMMITMENT AS A GUIDE FOR COMING YEARS. FRANCE WAS THUS ANXIOUS TO PRESERVE THIS SPECIAL CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER OF THE FRENCH DOCUMENT, WHICH MIGHT BE LOST IF THE ALLIES WERE TO ASSEMBLE A "CONFLOMERATE" DOCUMENT. IN ANY CASE, HE TENDED TO AGREE WITH DE STAERCHE'S COMMENT THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO BASE DISCUSSION ON ANY PARTICULAR DOCUMENT AND THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF IDEAS IN THE COUNCIL. DE ROSE WOULD REFER TO PARIS VARIOUS IDEAS WHICH EMERGED DURING SUCH A DISCUSSION.

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ALL NATO CAPITALS 3350

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13. LUNS SUMMED UP THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO "PRIMARY" TEXT FOR DRAFTING, AND THAT ALL PERMREPS SHOULD STATE NATIONAL VIEWS IN THE COUNCIL BEFORE THE SPC BEGAN DRAFTING. HE THEREUPON CALLED FOR NATIONAL STATEMENTS.

14. DE STAERCKE REFERRED TO FIFTH PARAGRAPH OF FRENCH TEXT AND POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT EUROPE ALONE THAT NEEDED TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO RISKS, BUT RATHER THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. THE TEXT SHOULD REFLECT THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDIBILITY, AND THIS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN APPROPRIATE PLACES THROUGHOUT THE FRENCH TEXT. DE STAERCKE SAID THAT THE DECLARATION MUST SAY SOMETHING ABOUT BURDEN-SHARING AND TURNED TO THE U.S. FOR ITS IDEAS. PERHAPS THERE MIGHT BE A REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR EQUITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS BY ALL. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE A REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO ADAPT THE ALLIANCE TO CHANGING CONDITIONS. ON ECONOMIC MATTERS, DE STAERCKE THOUGHT THE UK DRAFT HAD VALUABLE PASSAGES. HE SUGGESTED STRENGTHENING THE FRENCH TEXT AS REGARDS CONSULTATIONS BY INCORPORATING IDEAS FROM THE GERMAN DRAFT.

15. SUPPORTING DE STAERCKE ON BURDEN-SHARING, CATALANO CALLED
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FOR A REFERENCE TO MBFR AND THE SUBJECTS OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY. AS TO MAINTENANCE OF U.S. TROOPS, THE DECLARATION SHOULD SAY THAT U.S. FORCE LEVELS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AT A LEVEL NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE U.S. COMMITMENT.

16. PECK DID NOT LIKE THE STATEMENT IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE FRENCH DRAFT THAT NATO HAD "FULLY ACCOMPLISHED ITS MISSION", WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT NATO WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY AND COULD CREATE FURTHER PROBLEMS IN MAINTAINING ADEQUATE DEFENSE EFFORTS.

17. BUWALDA SUPPORTED DE STAERCKE'S REQUEST TO THE U.S. TO PROPOSE BURDEN-SHARING LANGUAGE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE NON-EC MEMBERS OF NATO SAY WHAT KIND OF LANGUAGE THEY WISHED TO ADD ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY MATTERS. BUWALDA AGREED WITH LUNS THAT THE DECLARATION MUST SATISFY THE U.S., BUT HE UNDERLINED THAT EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION, ESPECIALLY THAT OF YOUTH, MUST ALSO BE SATISFIED. THE DECLARATION MUST BE UNDERSTANDABLE TO THE YOUNGER GENERATION AND CONTAIN ELEMENTS THEY VALUED, SPECIFICALLY THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASSISTANCE TO THE THIRD WORLD. THE CANADIAN DRAFT WAS FAIRLY GOOD ON DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT THE NATO DECLARATION SHOULD SAY THAT MEMBER STATES CONTINUE TO SUBSCRIBE TO THESE PRINCIPLES. SOMETHING LIKE THE NETHERLANDS LANGUAGE CONCERNING THE THIRD WORLD WOULD BE NEEDED.

18. MARSHALL POINTED TO A TENDENCY IN THE FRENCH DRAFT TOWARD A "BILATERAL AXIS" BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE U.S. CANADA LOOKED UPON ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS AS BEING CIRCULAR, SYMBOLIZED BY THE COUNCIL'S ROUND TABLE. IF THE RELATIONSHIP WAS ONLY BILATERAL BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE U.S., BY DEFINITION EXCLUDING CANADA, THERE WAS NO POINT IN CANADA'S PRESENCE IN NATO OR IN MAINTAINING TROOPS IN EUROPE. THE IMPACT OF THE NATO DECLARATION ON THE CANADIAN PUBLIC WAS IMPORTANT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. CANADA LOOKED UPON THE TREATY AS PROVIDING FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE WHOLE NATO AREA. AT LEAST THEORETICALLY, EACH ALLY WOULD COME TO THE AID OF ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE 15.

19. DE ROSE RESPONDED THAT HE WAS SORRY IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY CANADIAN MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE FRENCH DRAFT. FRANCE DID NOT INTEND TO ESTABLISH ANY 13-TO-1 RELATIONSHIP AND HAD NO THOUGHT
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OF NEGLECTING CANADA. THE PRINCIPLE OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WAS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY AND FRANCE DID NOT WANT TO CHANGE ANYTHING IN THAT TREATY. AS TO THE FRENCH PAPER, IT STRESSED EUROPEAN PROBLEMS AND THE IDEA WAS TO GET ACROSS THAT THE EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION HAD A PARTICULAR IMPACT ON EUROPE. THIS IMPACT DID NOT APPLY TO CANADA. DE ROSE TOOK MARSHALL'S POINT, HOWEVER, AND WAS CERTAIN THAT FRANCE WOULD FIND FORMULATIONS TO WHICH CANADA WOULD NOT OBJECT.

20. RUMSFELD EMPHASIZED THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT THAT FOR THE DECLARATION AND OUR PROCESS IN ACHIEVING IT TO HAVE THE WEIGHT AND THE VALUE WE ATTRIBUTE TO IT WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE DECLARATION DIRECTLY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE 15. THE DECLARATION MUST NOT BE BETWEEN THE OTHER 14 ALLIES AND THE UNITED STATES, BUT RATHER SHOULD BE A DECLARATION SATISFACTORY TO EVERY ALLY.

21. LUNS ANNOUNCED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF WOULD NOW ISSUE ALL NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH, PREPARATORY TO THE NEXT COUNCIL DISCUSSION.

RUMSFELD

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